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Essay

Should the Supreme Court Fear
Congress?
Neal Devins†
Over the past two years, Congress has considered proposals to strip federal courts of jurisdiction over same-sex marriage,1 the Pledge of Allegiance,2 judicial invocations of international law,3 the public display of the Ten Commandments,4 and
legal challenges filed by “enemy combatants.”5 And while none
of these proposals were enacted,6 some of them were approved
by the House of Representatives.7 More striking, Congress expressed its disapproval of state court decision making in the
Terri Schiavo case by expanding federal court jurisdiction.8
Specifically, rather than accept state court findings that Terri
Schiavo, then in a persistent vegetative state,9 would rather die
† Goodrich Professor of Law and Professor of Government, College of
William and Mary. Thanks to Keith Whittington for helpful suggestions.
1. Marriage Protection Act, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004).
2. Pledge Protection Act, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2004).
3. Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568,
108th Cong. (2004).
4. Ten Commandments Defense Act, H.R. 2045, 108th Cong. (2003).
5. See Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2005, at A1.
6. Congress, however, did enact legislation limiting federal court jurisdiction in cases involving detainees at Guantánamo Bay. In its final form, this
legislation was not a rebuke of the Supreme Court for its decision in Rasul v.
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), allowing habeas filings by enemy combatants. Id.
at 484. Congress, instead, sought to balance judicial independence concerns
with the military’s need not to be bogged down defending frivolous lawsuits.
For additional discussion, see infra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.
7. The House approved proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction in cases involving same-sex marriage and the Pledge of Allegiance. See
supra notes 1–2.
8. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 15.
9. According to CNN, lower courts ruled that she was in a persistent
vegetative state. Schiavo’s Feeding Tube Removed, CNN.COM, Mar. 18, 2005,
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than be kept alive artificially, Congress asked the federal
courts to sort out whether the removal of a feeding tube violated Ms. Schiavo’s constitutional rights.10
The specter of lawmakers expressing their disapproval of
court decision making through retaliatory legislation seems
more real today than it has since Congress pursued jurisdiction-stripping measures against the Warren Court in the late
1950s.11 In addition to jurisdiction-altering proposals and legislation, Congress enacted legislation requiring that records be
kept of judges who made downward departures of Sentencing
Commission guidelines,12 and debated the creation of an officer
of “inspector general” to monitor federal court decision making.13 Commenting on how this dramatic increase in the criticism of judges has exacerbated “the strained relationship between the Congress and the federal Judiciary,” Chief Justice
William Rehnquist spoke, in January 2005, of his “hope that
the Supreme Court and all of our courts will continue to command sufficient public respect to enable them to survive basic
attacks on the[ir] judicial independence.”14 Three months later,
Justice Antonin Scalia sounded a more ominous message. Responding to Justice Stephen Breyer’s claim that “the treasure”
of this country is that people who criticize the Court will still
follow its rulings, Scalia suggested that the Supreme Court
“has become a very political institution. And when that happens, the people in a democracy will try to seize control of it.”15
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/03/18/schiavo.brain-damaged.
10. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo. For additional discussion, see infra notes 93–99 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
12. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(h), 117 Stat. 650, 672
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)). Commenting on this legislation, Chief
Justice Rehnquist complained that the “traditional interchange between the
Congress and the Judiciary broke down when Congress enacted” this legislation “without any consideration of the views of the Judiciary.” CHIEF JUSTICE
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2003 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
(2004), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003yearendreport
.html.
13. See F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary, Zale Lecture in Public Policy at Stanford University 3 (May 9, 2005),
http://judiciary.house.gov/media//pdfs/stanfordjudgesspeechpressversion505.
pdf.
14. CHIEF JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 4, 8 (2005), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
publicinfo/yearend/2004year-endreport.pdf.
15. Constitutional Conversation with Justices Breyer, O’Connor and
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But should the Supreme Court fear Congress? In the pages
that follow, I will argue that the Court need not moderate its
decision making in anticipation of a political backlash by today’s Congress. To make this point, I will highlight differences
between today’s Congress and the Congress that the Warren
Court confronted in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the late
1950s, Southerners (who opposed school desegregation) and
anti-Communist lawmakers formed a coalition in response to
Supreme Court rulings. These lawmakers truly wanted to undo
what the Court had done, and had very strong feelings about
Congress’s power to independently interpret the Constitution.16
Today, Congress is polarized along ideological lines. Party
identification is especially important—with Democrats and Republicans each seeking to send symbolic messages that reinforce their status with both party leaders and their political
base.17 Proposed jurisdiction-stripping measures are cut from
this cloth. The purpose of these bills is to make a symbolic
statement. That statement can be made whether or not these
measures are enacted.18
I will divide my comments into three parts. In Part I, I will
look at the profound role that social and political forces play in
shaping Supreme Court decision making. Part I will also explain why the Warren Court had good reason to take political
backlash into account when pursuing its campaigns to desegregate public schools and to protect the free speech rights of
Communists. In so doing, I will comment on whether and when
the Supreme Court should calibrate its decision making to
avoid political reprisals from Congress. In Part II, I will turn
my attention to today’s Congress. Initially, I will explain why
today’s lawmakers are more interested in strengthening their
base than in independently interpreting the Constitution.

Scalia, Moderated by “Meet the Press” Host Tim Russert (C-SPAN 2 television
broadcast Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.constitutioncenter.org (follow “Program Archives” hyperlink; then follow “Constitutional Conversation
with Supreme Court Justices” hyperlink; then follow “View the entire program
via RealVideo from CSPAN” hyperlink). A portion of this broadcast is transcribed in ‘The Abrams Report’ for April 22, MSNBC.COM, Apr. 25, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7629447/print/1/displamode/1098.
16. See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 62–76 and accompanying text. I also make this point
in a short essay examining why the Supreme Court was a low-salience issue in
the 2004 presidential elections. See Neal Devins, Smoke, Not Fire, 65 MD. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2006).
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Against this backdrop, I will discuss recent congressional efforts to slap down state and federal judges by expanding or restricting federal court jurisdiction. In Part III, I will discuss
whether the Supreme Court should feel constrained in any way
by Congress. Among other things, I will call attention to differences between federalism rulings (where the Court should not
feel constrained) and rights-based rulings (where there is
greater risk of a Court decision prompting a legislative backlash).
I. THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE19
Supreme Court Justices cannot escape the social and political forces that engulf elected officials. Consider, for example,
the appointments and confirmation process: “[b]ecause presidents usually nominate Justices with philosophies similar to
their own and the Senate generally confirms only nominees
who have views consistent with the contemporary political
mainstream, regular turnover results in a Court majority
rarely holding significantly divergent political preferences from
those held by the president and Congress.”20 Under this view,
even Justices who vote their policy preferences will generally
reach conclusions that are palatable to elected officials.
Justices who do not have strong policy preferences, moreover, often take into account elected official preferences, public
opinion, elite opinion (newspapers, academics), and interest
group filings.21 For these Justices, it does not matter that their
votes sometimes back liberal interests and other times back
conservative causes. What matters, instead, is reaching outcomes that balance the needs of competing external interests
(or at least those interests that these Justices think important).22
19. The title of this part plays off of LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998). The analysis which follows is generally consistent with Epstein and Knight.
20. Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583, 586 (2001) (discussing Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policymaker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279 (1957)).
21. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988) (describing the process by which constitutional law develops and the sources that
influence that development); Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 176–79 (1998) (discussing impact of
elite opinion on Supreme Court decision making).
22. These Justices are also apt to use certiorari denials to steer away from
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There is a third way that social and political forces shape
Court decision making. Some Justices may seek to advance
their preferred policy position by taking elected officials’ desires
into account. These Justices are concerned about both the refusal of elected officials to implement Court edicts and the
prospects of elected officials negating or limiting an unpopular
ruling by statute, constitutional amendment, or some other
court-curbing action. Implementation concerns, for example,
played a prominent role in the Watergate Tapes case, United
States v. Nixon.23 Recognizing that the President might fail to
comply with a fractured Court ruling, the Justices negotiated a
compromise position on the question of executive privilege in
order to secure a unanimous ruling.24 Likewise, in Brown v.
Board of Education,25 the Court crafted a unanimous opinion
that took into account likely Southern opposition to the decision.26 Specifically, rather than ask Southern school systems to
desegregate, the Court both left it to local judges to take “varied local school problems” into account and spoke of school authorities as having “primary responsibility” for “assessing” and
“solving” these problems.27 Correspondingly, the Court waited
until 1968 to demand that desegregation plans promise “realistically to work now.”28 At that time, Congress and the White
House—through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and implementing
regulations—made clear that the federal government backed
school desegregation.29
“no win” cases, that is, cases which place them in the middle of a political firestorm. For this very reason, the Rehnquist Court’s swing Justices—Sandra
Day O’Connor and Anthony Kennedy—often used delaying strategies to avoid
Court consideration of divisive social issues. See Neal Devins, Congress and
the Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 776
(2003).
23. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
24. BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 344–47 (1979).
25. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
26. For discussions of how the Justices bargained with each other and the
importance of unanimity, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1
(1979); S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689
(1971).
27. Brown, 349 U.S. at 299.
28. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
29. See NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
154–58 (2004). For identical reasons, the Court steered clear of the antimiscegenation issue until 1967 (when it invalidated state bans on interracial marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967)). Fearing a backlash that
would jeopardize its school desegregation decision, the Court refused to hear a
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That a Court which lacks the powers of the purse and
sword would take implementation concerns into account is
hardly surprising. Likewise, it is to be expected that some Justices take into account lawmaker efforts to punish the Court for
politically unpopular decisions. Justices with weak policy preferences do not want to precipitate an imbroglio with Congress;
Justices with strong policy preferences want Congress to acquiesce to, not nullify, Court rulings.30 For this very reason, jurisdiction-stripping proposals sometimes alter judicial behavior.31
Consider, for example, the Warren Court’s retreat from
mid-1950s decisions providing civil liberties protections to
1955 challenge to Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute. See EPSTEIN &
KNIGHT, supra note 19, at 83; LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 71–73 (2000).
30. See generally EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 19 (discussing the strategic nature of Supreme Court decision making); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game,
79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) (using game theory to describe Supreme Court interaction with Congress and the President). For a critique of Epstein & Knight
arguing both that the Court need not take congressional preferences into account and that the Justices rarely pay attention to lawmaker desires, see
Frank B. Cross, The Justices of Strategy, 48 DUKE L.J. 511, 527–31 (1998). See
also Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of
Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 31–33 (1997) (noting reasons
why the Court cannot predict and probably should not fear retaliation from
Congress).
31. See Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 309, 320–21 (1980); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing Periods in
American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925, 943 (1965); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 378–
83, 386–94 (1992). In addition to jurisdiction-stripping proposals, courtcurbing measures that limit judicial review include appropriations measures
that prohibit Justice Department participation in lawsuits on specified topics
and legislation dictating the type of relief a federal court can order when
remedying a constitutional violation. See LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 44–45 (1992) (discussing congressional efforts to limit court-ordered busing). For more recent examples, see
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1464–65 (2001). See also supra
note 6 (discussing legislation limiting detainee access to federal courts). Finally, Congress may enact legislation that limits the reach of disfavored constitutional rulings. See Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and
Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 89 (1998) (listing examples).
Congress may also nullify unpopular rulings without denying (or limiting)
the federal courts’ role in our system of checks and balances. When Congress
enacts legislation correcting a perceived judicial misinterpretation of a statute,
Congress moots—but does not nullify—the Court’s previous decision. Likewise, Congress may seek to moot a constitutional ruling by sending a constitutional amendment to the states for ratification.
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Communists and other subversives. During its 1956–1957
term, the Court decided twelve cases involving Communists,
ruling against the government in every case.32 Congress responded with a vengeance, coming—as Chief Justice Warren
put it— “dangerously close” to enacting legislation that would
have stripped the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction in
five domestic security areas.33 The Court relented, issuing decisions that limited the scope of earlier rulings and otherwise
permitting the government to prosecute subversive cases.34 As
the New York Times editorialized in early 1960, “what Senator
Jenner [the principal sponsor of court-stripping legislation] was
unable to achieve [in Congress] the Supreme Court has now
virtually accomplished on its own.”35
The question remains: should the 1957 Warren Court have
feared Congress? For the reasons that follow, I think that the
answer to this question is a qualified “yes.” First, the Court
could not take comfort in Congress’s longstanding tradition of
defending judicial independence. FDR’s 1937 Court-packing
proposal had almost been enacted.36 Twenty years later, the received wisdom about Court-packing was that the Court had
saved itself by executing an “astonishing about-face” in the
spring of 1937, jettisoning the Lochner era by approving state
and federal reform efforts in the midst of congressional consideration of the Court-packing bill.37 Consequently, after Congress came close to approving jurisdiction-stripping legislation
in 1957, the Court could not assume that the war had been
32. For a summary of these decisions, see POWE, supra note 29, at 90–99.
33. EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 313 (1977). For a
similar assessment, see POWE, supra note 29, at 132–33. For an illuminating
discussion of why President Eisenhower might well have signed such a bill
(notwithstanding the fact that his Justice Department testified against it), see
WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 170–71 (1962).
34. See MURPHY, supra note 33, at 245–46; POWE, supra note 29, at 135–
56. The fact that most of the 1956 decisions were grounded in the Justices’ interpretation of federal statutes, not the Constitution, allowed the Court to beat
a hasty retreat without overruling itself. See Philip P. Frickey, Getting from
Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV.
397, 420–25 (2005).
35. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 245 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1960, at 36:1).
36. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 148–
52 (1995).
37. See id. at 154–56. For a competing account suggesting that the 1937
“switch” had nothing to do with Court-packing, see generally BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).

DEVINS_3FMT

1344

05/17/2006 09:10:35 AM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[90:1337

won.38 Second, Court decision making was truly upsetting to
significant factions within Congress. Fears about Communism
and its threat to domestic security resonated with both lawmakers and the American people. Even though the crisis atmosphere of the early 1950s had eased, Congress continued to
beat the anti-Communist drum.39 More than that, Southern
lawmakers strongly disapproved of Brown and, with it, the
Court. One hundred one of the 128 Southerners in Congress
signed a Manifesto “pledg[ing] to use all lawful means to bring
about a reversal of” the decision.40 With Southern lawmakers
joining forces with anti-Communist lawmakers, the Court understood that it could ill afford to agitate this potent coalition.41
Third (and relatedly), a substantial number of lawmakers in
the late 1950s thought that courts should give great weight to
congressional interpretations of the Constitution. These lawmakers embraced an “independent constitutionalist” perspective, emphasizing the distinctive constitutional responsibilities
of the legislature and pointing to drawbacks associated with
leaving interpretation strictly to judges.42 In particular, forty
percent of lawmakers thought that courts should give “control-

38. Indeed, Congress did narrow a 1957 ruling (Jencks v. United States,
353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957) (allowing an alleged Communist to have access to all
government documents touching the events and activities at issue in his trial))
by specifying that a criminal defendant can only gain access to documents involving his own statements or the statements of a witness called by the government to testify. Act of Sept. 2, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000)). And while this may have only
been a “watered-down measure to modify slightly one evidentiary rule used in
criminal trials,” Barry Friedman, “Things Forgotten” in the Debate over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 752 (1998), Congress nonetheless
used this bill to signal its willingness to enact correcting legislation.
39. See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 246–91
(1966).
40. 102 CONG. REC. 4515–16 (1956). The “true meaning” of this Manifesto,
as Anthony Lewis observed, “was to make defiance of the Supreme Court . . .
socially acceptable in the South.” ANTHONY LEWIS, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 45
(1964). Correspondingly, a 1957 poll about public attitudes towards the Supreme Court revealed that twenty percent of Americans had changed their attitude in recent years, with three-quarters of those saying that they now had
an unfavorable view of the Court. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 264 (discussing a
Gallup Poll about the Court). Of those who changed their mind, six out of
every seven Southerners reported that their opinion of the Court had changed
for the worse. Id. at 265.
41. See MORGAN, supra note 39, at 270; POWE, supra note 29, at 134.
42. See Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Attitudes Towards Constitutional Interpretation, in CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 39, 44 (Neal
Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005).
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ling weight” to congressional interpretations of the Constitution.43 For these lawmakers, Congress had reason to assert itself in the face of Court decisions undermining lawmaker interpretations of the Constitution.
That Congress was poised to act, of course, does not mean
that Congress would have acted. After all, Congress did not enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation in 1957. Congress, moreover, had signaled its support for an independent Court
through word and deeds. FDR’s Court-packing plan was ultimately rebuked, and an “uninterrupted expansion of federal
court jurisdiction . . . revealed a high degree of congressional
respect for and reliance on the federal courts that a few unpopular decisions simply could not erode.”44 More than that,
there are numerous veto points in the legislative process. In
addition to a possible presidential veto, proposed legislation
must clear committees and gain approval by both the House
and Senate.45 Procedural obstacles placed by committee leaders, party leaders or members can also result in the tabling of
proposed legislation.46
On balance, however, the Court’s moderates—Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan—had good reason to reverse
course. By approving government regulation of subversives, the
Court “helped sap the vigor of the Court attacks” and “provided
a ready means by which the Court foes could execute a facesaving retreat of their own.”47 Assuming that Frankfurter and
Harlan were ambivalent about the Court’s Communist rulings,
the benefits of this retreat certainly outweighed the risks of jurisdiction-stripping legislation and, more generally, strained relations with Congress. But even if Frankfurter and Harlan
firmly backed the initial rulings, the retreat may still have
made sense. As Walter Murphy concluded in his study of this

43. Id. at 48 (extrapolating survey data found in MORGAN, supra note 39,
at 365–83). Not surprisingly, Southern lawmakers disproportionately embraced this “independent constitutionalist” perspective. See id. at 45.
44. Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability and
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78
IND. L.J. 153, 209 (2003); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Four: Law’s Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 971,
1028–46 (2000) (highlighting public support for the Court during the Courtpacking periods).
45. See Segal, supra note 30, at 31–32.
46. This is what ultimately happened to the 1957 proposal. See POWE, supra note 29, at 131–33.
47. MURPHY, supra note 33, at 238.
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episode: “The retreat of the Warren Court was a tactical withdrawal, not a rout.”48 No constitutional rulings were overturned, and the Court held firm to its rejection of Jim Crow.
Over the next few years, moreover, turnover in Congress and
the White House facilitated a string of Court rulings that provided expanded civil liberties protections to Communists and
other critics of the government.49
The sensibility of the Warren Court calibrating its decision
making in the face of a hostile Congress does not mean that the
Supreme Court ipso facto should moderate its decision making
when faced with criticism by Congress or other elected officials.
Unlike the Warren Court, for example, the Burger Court had
no reason to fear the enactment of Carter- and Reagan-era proposals to strip the courts of jurisdiction over abortion, school
busing, and school prayer.50 Not only did the Democraticallycontrolled House refuse to act on these proposals, the Reagan
administration did not back Court-stripping proposals.51
The Burger Court experience is revealing for another reason. Even though the Court did not retool its doctrine on abortion, school prayer, and busing, it did not block Congress from
expressing disagreement with these decisions. Congress, for
example, was able to use its appropriations powers to signal its
disapproval of abortion rights and busing remedies.52 Through
the Equal Access Act (mandating that public schools allow religious organizations equal access to school facilities), moreover,
Congress was able to facilitate religious expression in public

48. Id. at 246.
49. See Frickey, supra note 34, at 426–39; see also Neal Devins, Commentary to Philip P. Frickey & Gordon Silverstein, Congress and the Earl Warren
Court, BULL. AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI., Summer 2004, at 6, 15 (suggesting that
the Court acted opportunistically in returning to the Communist issue at a
time when it knew that Congress would not resist its decision making).
50. See EDWARD KEYNES WITH RANDALL K. MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION 200–03, 217–44, 291–98 (1989).
51. See id. Notwithstanding its attacks on the Court for its lawless, activist decision making, administration officials contended that several of these
proposals were unconstitutional and/or bad public policy. See Nomination of
Edwin Meese III: Hearings on the President’s Nomination of Edwin Meese III
to be Attorney General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 185–97 (1984) (statements of Attorney General nominee
Meese and outgoing Attorney General Smith that Court-stripping proposals
are often unwise and constitutionally impermissible).
52. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 132–34 (abortion); id. at 159–
61 (busing).
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schools.53 By providing elected officials with an opportunity to
register their policy preferences, the Court helped avoid a headon confrontation with Congress and the White House.54
The lesson here is simple: the Supreme Court can pursue
its favored policies so long as Congress can pursue its favored
policies. Congress’s rejection of Court-packing in the 1930s and
its failure to enact jurisdiction-stripping legislation in the
1950s or 1980s suggests that lawmakers are reluctant to challenge the premises of an independent judiciary.55 Nevertheless,
if Court decision making cuts at the core of lawmaker preferences, Congress may act and may act boldly. For that reason,
the Court had good reason to retreat from both the Lochner era
and from 1957 rulings protecting the civil liberty interests of
Communists. The Burger era, in contrast, was a time in which
Congress was divided over the soundness of Court rulings on
abortion, school busing, and school prayer. A majority of members were willing to express disapproval through appropriation
bans and other indirect challenges. A majority, however, could
not coalesce around a more fundamental challenge to the
Court’s decision making. Consequently, the Burger Court made
few concessions to Congress.56
What then of the Roberts Court? Should it see recent attacks on judicial independence as a harbinger of things to
come? In the next part of this Essay, I will argue that recent jurisdiction-stripping proposals are little more than rhetorical
ploys. Indeed, Congress-Court relations during the past decade
signal congressional disinterest in the Constitution and the
Supreme Court.57 For these and other reasons, the Roberts
Court should not fear Congress.

53. Id. at 203–04.
54. For an illuminating treatment of how it is that judicial review does
not impinge on important congressional interests—so long as there are outlets
for Congress to advance its favored policies—see generally J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS (2004). For a review of
this book that emphasizes this phenomenon, see Keith E. Whittington, James
Madison Has Left the Building, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2005) (book review).
For additional discussion, see infra notes 125–30 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
56. In fact, there is no reason to think that the Justices were not voting
their sincere policy preferences when upholding congressional spending prerogatives (Burger Court) or equal access legislation (Rehnquist Court).
57. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text.
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II. MAKING SENSE OF ONGOING LAWMAKER
CHALLENGES TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The current round of congressional attacks against the
courts is much more a reflection of fundamental changes in
Congress than it is about lawmaker disappointment with Supreme Court decision making. Unlike attacks against the Warren or Burger Courts, the Rehnquist Court did not issue decisions that were terribly upsetting to lawmakers.58 If anything,
Congress has not used jurisdiction-stripping measures to express its disapproval with the results of Rehnquist Court decision making. Only proposed legislation on habeas petitions filed
by Guantánamo Bay detainees sought to nullify a Rehnquist
Court decision.59 But lawmakers rejected an outright ban on
federal court jurisdiction, preferring legislation that allowed
D.C. Circuit Court review of military tribunal judgments.60 The
only other court-stripping bill responsive to Supreme Court decision making did not target the outcome of any particular decision. Instead, lawmakers sought to forbid federal courts from
considering foreign law.61
58. See Neal Devins, Congress as Culprit: How Lawmakers Spurred on the
Court’s Anti-Congress Crusade, 51 DUKE L.J. 435, 448–54 (2001).
59. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, S. 1042,
109th Cong. § 1092(d) (as passed by Senate, Nov. 15, 2005). The bill was sponsored by Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and took direct aim at the Supreme
Court’s recognition of detainee rights in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
According to Graham, detainees were enemy combatants and, as such, should
not have meaningful access to civilian courts. Press Release, Senator Lindsey
Graham, Senate Passes Graham Detainee Plan (Nov. 10, 2005), http://lgraham
.senate.gov/index.cfm?mode=presspage&id=248690; see also Schmitt, supra
note 5.
60. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No.
109-163, § 1405, 119 Stat. 3136, 3476–79 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801); see
Jonathan Weisman, Senators Agree on Detainee Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 15,
2005, at A1. By limiting federal judicial review of military commission verdicts
to the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court may be without power to review detainee appeals. That issue may be decided by the Supreme Court in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld, No. 05-184, a lawsuit challenging the legality of U.S. military
commissions at Guantánamo. See Charles Lane, Court Case Challenges Power
of President, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2006, at A1. For additional discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 116–17. See also Charles Lane, Case Tests
Power of Judiciary, President, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2006, at A6 (noting that
Solicitor General Clement's efforts to argue that the Court was without authority to decide Hamdan “immediately landed him in trouble with several
justices, who found the terms of the [Detainee Treatment Act] . . . too vague to
warrant cutting back what they regard as a vital judicial check on unlawful
executive detentions”).
61. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong.
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Rather than focus on the Supreme Court, lawmakers targeted any judicial ruling that was upsetting to its constituents.
Some of these rulings come from state courts (the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s gay marriage decision62 and decisions of
the Florida courts in the Terri Schiavo case);63 others come
from lower federal courts (the Ninth Circuit’s invalidation of
the Pledge of Allegiance64 and a district court order requiring
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore to remove the Ten Commandments from the state Supreme Court rotunda).65 It does
not matter that some of these rulings involve issues that are
not subject to federal court review (the Massachusetts gay marriage decision)66 and others are about issues that the Supreme
Court has signaled its likely agreement with Congress (the
Pledge of Allegiance).67 Proponents of these measures want to
send a message: Congress will advance its policymaking
agenda by striking back at the courts. This message, however,
is a symbolic one. More significantly, this message is not directed at the courts; it is directed at interest groups and voters.68
Dramatic differences between today’s Congress and the
Warren- and Burger-era Congresses explain why lawmakers
have incentive to launch rhetorical attacks against the courts
through jurisdiction-stripping and related proposals. The defin(2005).
62. Goodridge v. Mass. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
63. The Schiavo litigation stretched on for years, with perhaps the most
important decision coming in September of 2004 when the Florida Supreme
Court struck down a law that gave Governor Bush the power to reinsert
Schiavo’s feeding tube. Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 (Fla. 2004).
64. Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. Glassroth v. Moore, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1349 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
66. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941.
67. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), no
Justice concluded that the Pledge was unconstitutional. Five Justices concluded that the plaintiff was without standing to challenge the Pledge, id. at
17–18; three Justices (Rehnquist, C.J., O’Connor & Thomas, JJ.) filed concurring opinions defending the constitutionality of the Pledge, id. at 31, 33, 46;
and one Justice (Scalia, J.) recused himself from the case after making specific
remarks on it prior to its being appealed to the Court. See Linda Greenhouse,
Supreme Court to Consider Case on ‘Under God’ in Pledge to Flag, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2003, at A1. Justice Scalia specifically mentioned the Ninth Circuit
decision “as an example of how courts were misinterpreting the Constitution
to ‘exclude God from the public forums and from political life.’” Id.
68. See Neal Devins, Tom DeLay: Popular Constitutionalist?, 81 CHI.KENT L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (suggesting that interest group pressure explains Congress’s intervention in the Terri Schiavo case).
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ing feature of today’s Congress is political polarization along
ideological lines.69 Liberal “Rockefeller Republicans” and conservative “Southern Democrats” no longer ensure ideological
diversity within the parties. In the South, conservative Democrats were replaced with Southern Republicans—so that the remaining Southern Democrats are far more liberal.70 Correspondingly, moderate-to-liberal Republicans were replaced by
“Ronald Reagan’s GOP.” A 2004–2005 study, for example,
documented that (with one exception) every Republican member of the House and Senate is more conservative than their
Democratic counterpart.71
This ideological divide now seems a permanent feature of
Congress.72 Outside of presidential elections, Democrats and
Republicans have little reason to appeal to median voters. With
only one-half of eligible voters actually voting, candidates and
party leaders increasingly look to the party’s partisan base for
support.73 Equally significant, there no longer are competitive
races in the House of Representatives. District lines are drawn
in ways that guarantee certain seats to Democrats and other
seats to Republicans.74 As a result, the party primary controls

69. My discussion of political polarization in Congress is drawn from Neal
Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons from
Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1526–27, 1534–45 (2005).
70. See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party
Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives,
1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 305, 306 (2003).
71. The one exception was former Senator Zell Miller, a Democrat from
Georgia who was more conservative than a handful of Republican Senators.
See 108th House Ranking Order (Aug. 23, 2005), http://voteview.com/
hou108.htm; 108th Senate Rank Ordering (Oct. 24, 2004), http://voteview.com/
sen108.htm.
72. See Sean M. Theriault, The Case of the Vanishing Moderates: Party
Polarization in the Modern Congress 5–6 (May 2, 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.la.utexas.edu/~seant/vanishing.pdf (noting that party polarization is “one of the most obvious and recognizable trends” in the modern
Congress and that the “overwhelming evidence” is that party members increasingly return to their “ideological homes”).
73. David S. Broder, Editorial, An Old-Fashioned Win, WASH. POST, Nov.
4, 2004, at A25. For this very reason, President Bush targeted religious conservatives in his 2004 reelection campaign. Laurie Goodstein & William Yardley, President Benefits from Efforts to Build a Coalition of Religious Voters,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at A22; Dana Milbank, For the President, a Vote of
Full Faith and Credit, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at A7.
74. See Samuel Issacharoff, Collateral Damage: The Endangered Center in
American Politics, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415, 427–28 (2004).

DEVINS_3FMT

2006]

05/17/2006 09:10:35 AM

SHOULD THE COURT FEAR CONGRESS?

1351

who will win the election and, consequently, candidates focus
their energies on the partisans who vote in these primaries.75
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that Democratic
and Republican lawmakers increasingly see themselves as
members of a party, not as independent power brokers. Correspondingly, Democrats and Republicans look to party leaders to
formulate a message that will resonate with their increasingly
partisan base.76 Constitutional values certainly figure into this
message: Democrats emphasize that they are the party of civil
rights and individual liberties. During the Roberts and Alito
confirmation hearings, for example, Democratic Senators spoke
at length about abortion, voting rights, the use of torture in
fighting the War on Terror, and federalism-based limits on
Congress’s power to enact antidiscrimination legislation.77 Republicans, especially House Republicans, send a message that
resonates with social conservatives. Republican-led efforts to
countermand state and federal court decisions on same-sex
marriage, the sanctity of life, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
Ten Commandments exemplify this practice.78
The consequences of this shift to “message politics” are profound. First, lawmakers are less interested in what happens to
legislation after it is enacted—including a court decision striking down legislation.79 As compared to earlier Congresses (including the Warren-era Congress), “[t]he electoral requirement
[for today’s lawmaker] is not that he make pleasing things

75. See id.; Jeffrey Rosen, Center Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 17. Furthermore, with more than half of all Senators having
first served in the House, the partisan battle lines that characterize the House
are increasingly spilling over to the Senate. See Rosen, supra.
76. See generally C. Lawrence Evans, Committees, Leaders, and Message
Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 217, 219–21 (Lawrence C. Dodd &
Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001) (discussing the emergence of message politics).
77. See Adam Nagourney, Partisan Tenor of Alito Hearing Reflects a
Quick Change in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at A17; Robin Toner
& David D. Kirkpatrick, Liberals and Conservatives Remain Worlds Apart on
Roberts’s Suitability, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2005, at A22. For similar reasons,
Democrats had earlier accused the Rehnquist Court of engaging in “conservative judicial activism.” Neal Devins, The Federalism-Rights Nexus: Explaining
Why Senate Democrats Can Tolerate Rehnquist Court Decision Making but Not
the Rehnquist Court, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1307, 1308 & n.3 (2002).
78. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text; infra notes 93–100 and
accompanying text.
79. See Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the
Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 512–15 (2001).
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happen but that he make pleasing judgmental statements.”80
Indeed, a Supreme Court ruling invalidating a federal statute
provides lawmakers with an opportunity to score political
points by denouncing the Court.81
Second, today’s lawmakers do not place a high value on
their power to independently interpret the Constitution. Consider, for example, congressional committee evaluation of constitutional questions. Over the past thirty years, the percent of
hearings raising significant constitutional issues has declined
throughout Congress.82 One explanation for this phenomenon is
the growing ideological polarization in Congress.83 As compared
to the Warren and Burger Court eras (where regional divides
and ideological diversity cut back the power of party leaders),
today’s lawmakers are committed to their party’s policy
agenda. The question of whether the Supreme Court will find
that agenda constitutional matters less to today’s lawmakers.84
Consider, for example, the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival. Even though the Court invalidated all or part of twentythree statutes from 1995 to 2000, Congress held as many hearings about federalism in the 1970s as it did in the 1990s.85
More than that, the hearings that it did hold in the 1990s did
not focus on the Court; instead, they were mainly concerned
with the federalism implications of the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress.86
80. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 62 (2d
ed. 2004).
81. For an excellent treatment of this topic (looking at Rehnquist Court
federalism rulings), see Whittington, supra note 79, at 512–18. Lawmakers
can also score political points by denouncing a state court ruling. Legislation
mandating federal court review of the Terri Schiavo case and proposed legislation banning federal court consideration of same-sex marriage are examples of
this phenomenon.
82. See Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional
Committees: 1971–2000, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Richard Bauman & Tsvi Kahana
eds., forthcoming July 2006). Of those committees that regularly considered
constitutional questions (education, labor, foreign affairs, judiciary), the only
ones that continue to hold the same number of constitutional hearings are the
Judiciary Committees. See id.
83. For a more detailed treatment, see id.
84. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
85. See Whittington et al., supra note 82.
86. See id. For a more detailed treatment of 1990s hearings, see Keith E.
Whittington, Hearing About the Constitution in Congressional Committees, in
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 42, at 87, 95–105. See also
Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J.
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When today’s Congress considers constitutional questions,
moreover, lawmakers steer clear of nonpartisan witnesses, preferring instead to hear from witnesses that will back up the
preexisting views of the party that selects that witness.87 An
increasingly ideological, increasingly polarized Congress sees
hearings as staged events in which each side can call witnesses
who will explain their views to the public.88 In sharp contrast,
committee hearings during the Warren and Burger Court eras
reflected ideological diversity within the Democratic and Republican parties. Most notably, several Senate committees
made use of unified staffs and generally operated in a bipartisan way—so that hearings considering constitutional questions
often featured nonpartisan academic experts.89
Another measure of how today’s Congress differs from the
earlier Congresses is lawmaker attitudes towards congressional
interpretation of the Constitution. In 1959 (when lawmakers
cared intensely about Warren Court decisions on school desegregation and subversives) forty percent of lawmakers thought
that courts should give controlling weight to congressional interpretations of the Constitution; in 1999–2000 (during the
height of the Rehnquist Court federalism revival), only 13.8
percent of lawmakers thought that the courts should give controlling weight to congressional interpretations of the Constitution.90 Correspondingly, seventy-one percent of today’s lawmakers adhere to a “joint constitutionalist” perspective
whereby courts should give either “limited” or “no weight” to
congressional assessments of the constitutionality of legislation.91

123, 125 (2003) (arguing that lawmakers agreed with Rehnquist Court federalism decisions and, for that reason, did not seek to countermand the Court for
invalidating federal statutes).
87. See Devins, supra note 69, at 1542–44.
88. See ROGER H. DAVIDSON & WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESS AND ITS
MEMBERS 217 (10th ed. 2006) (“Hearings are often orchestrated as a form of
political theater . . . .”). Furthermore, because there is rarely an academic consensus on the constitutional questions that divide Democrats and Republicans,
committee staffers can always find a sincere, well-qualified constitutional law
expert willing to back their position.
89. See Devins, supra note 69, at 1543 (making this point by comparing
today’s congressional practices with those in the 1970s).
90. Bruce G. Peabody, Congressional Constitutional Interpretation and the
Courts: A Preliminary Inquiry into Legislative Attitudes, 1959–2001, 29 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 127, 147 (2004).
91. Id.
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Third, lawmakers have incentive to launch rhetorical attacks against the courts. As noted above, today’s Congress is
both more accepting of Supreme Court decisions invalidating
federal statutes and less constrained by its responsibility to independently interpret the Constitution. By placing significant
emphasis on the message they deliver to their base, lawmakers
see court rulings as opportunities to make judgmental statements that resonate with their party and their constituents
(voters and interest groups).92 Consider, for example, legislation expanding federal court jurisdiction in the Terri Schiavo
case.93 The National Right to Life Committee drafted the original bill.94 More significantly, then-House majority leader Tom
DeLay and Senate majority leader Bill Frist both pushed for
legislation in order to strengthen their ties to Christian conservatives.95 Frist spoke of the bill as “affirm[ing] our nation’s
commitment to preserving the sanctity of life”96 to shore up
support from right-to-life interests in his burgeoning 2008 run
for the presidency. DeLay used the Schiavo issue to rally social
conservatives behind him in the face of charges and attacks
over alleged ethics violations.97 In a speech to the Family Research Council, DeLay linked the negative response to the
Schiavo legislation from media elites to coordinated attacks on
American conservatism and his own ethics battles.98 For DeLay: “[t]hat whole syndicate that they have going on right now

92. See Whittington, supra note 79, at 513.
93. An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109-3, 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. (119 Stat.) 15.
94. See Lynn Vincent, The Fight of Her Life, WORLD MAG., Mar. 19, 2005,
http://www.worldmag.com/articles/10431.
95. See David Kirkpatrick & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, How Family’s Cause
Reached the Halls of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at A1; Shailagh
Murray & Mike Allen, Schiavo Case Tests Priorities of GOP, WASH. POST,
Mar. 26, 2005, at A1; The Doctor’s New Right Wing, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30,
2005, at 32. For similar reasons, Frist spoke at “Justice Sunday,” a nationallytelevised Family Research Council event depicting Democratic opposition to
George W. Bush judicial nominations as “tyranny to people of faith.” Frist
Speaks to Christian Anti-Filibuster Rally, CNN.COM, Apr. 25, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/04/24/justice.sunday/.
96. Press Release, Office of Senator Bill Frist, Frist Comments on Schiavo
Bill Enrollment (Mar. 21, 2005), http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=1886&Month=3&Year=2005.
97. See Carl Hulse & Adam Nagourney, Briefly Back in the Spotlight, DeLay Now Steps Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2005, at A9.
98. See id.
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is for one purpose and one purpose only, and that is to destroy
the conservative movement.”99
Recent court-stripping proposals are cut from the same
cloth. The Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, for example,
sought to strengthen ties between the GOP and religious conservatives by denying federal courts the power to review a government official’s “acknowledgment of God as the sovereign
source of law, liberty, or government.”100 The bill responded to
a longstanding grievance between the religious right and the
courts, namely, that “since the famous prayer in school cases
[in 1963], our Federal courts have showed increased hostility
toward the acknowledgment of God in the public square.”101
More immediately, the bill expressed disapproval of a federal
court decision ordering Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore to
remove a granite monument of the Ten Commandments from
the state Supreme Court rotunda.102 The fact that Moore had
been removed from office for failing to comply with this federal
court ruling did not deter bill sponsors; if anything, Moore’s
willingness to stand on conviction encouraged sponsors to
strengthen their ties to religious conservatives by celebrating
Moore’s faith-based campaign against the courts.103

99. Id. In May 2005, conservative leaders threw a banquet in honor of
DeLay; at that banquet, DeLay was presented with a petition signed by conservative leaders “decry[ing]” attacks on DeLay and calling on Congress to
protect the country “from tyrannical judges who currently operate free of any
restraints.” Sam Rosenfeld, Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, Jul. 2005,
http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&
articleId=9867.
100. Constitution Restoration Act of 2004, H.R. 3799, 108th Cong. (2004).
101. 150 CONG. REC. H7079 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 2004) (statement of Rep.
Pence).
102. See Rosenfeld, supra note 99.
103. Indeed, Moore testified at both Senate and House hearings on the
Constitution Restoration Act—hearings intended to publicize the federal
courts’ hostility towards religion. See Beyond the Pledge of Allegiance: Hostility
to Religious Expression in the Public Square Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 24–27 (2004) (statement of Roy S. Moore, Former C.J., Supreme
Court of Alabama); Constitution Restoration Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3799
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 74–98 (2004) (statement of Roy S.
Moore, Foundation for Moral Law, Inc.); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 99 (arguing that the Moore hearings provided “another opportunity to stoke and sustain the outrage of the Christian right”).
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Republicans have also used jurisdiction-stripping proposals
on same-sex marriage,104 the Pledge of Allegiance,105 and judicial invocations of international law106 to reaffirm their commitment to the social conservative agenda. In so doing, Republican leaders hope that religious and other social conservatives
will back the GOP in congressional and presidential elections.
For example, the House debated and voted on the Pledge and
same-sex marriage bills immediately before the 2004 elections.107 At that time, Republican strategists thought that
President Bush’s reelection might hinge on the willingness of
religious conservatives to vote in the 2004 elections.108 More
generally, Republican leaders sought to detract attention from
the war in Iraq by turning the 2004 election into a referendum
on moral values.109
In pursuing these objectives, it does not matter whether jurisdiction-stripping proposals are enacted (let alone found constitutional). Indeed, since Americans have historically supported judicial independence,110 Republican leaders have little
to gain by pushing for the enactment of these bills. Perhaps for
this reason, two of the 2003–2004 jurisdiction-stripping bills
never made it out of committee (official acknowledgments of
God, invocations of international law); the other two were approved, but the vote was so late in the 2004 session that the
bills were never considered in the Senate (same-sex marriage,
the Pledge of Allegiance).111
In 2005, House Republicans reintroduced these measures.112 Unlike the Warren-era, there is little reason for the
104. Marriage Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1100, 109th Cong. (2005).
105. Pledge Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 2028, 108th Cong. (2003).
106. American Justice for American Citizens Act, H.R. 1658, 109th Cong.
(2005).
107. H.R. Res. 781, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong.
(2004).
108. Peter Wallsten, Conflicted Evangelicals Could Cost Bush Votes, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2004, at A1.
109. See Milbank, supra note 73 (noting that while moral values ranked
below security and economic issues as an explanation for the vote, the election
was “unique in the assertiveness of evangelicals and the overt appeals made
by the candidates to the faithful”).
110. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text; see also CHARLES
GARDNER GEYH, WHEN COURTS AND CONGRESS COLLIDE 1–21 (forthcoming
2006).
111. For a detailed discussion of the timing of the votes, see Devins, supra
note 18 .
112. House Republicans, on December 16, 2005, also introduced the Safe-
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Roberts Court to see these bills as a threat to their independence. For reasons detailed above, Congress has incentive to
launch rhetorical attacks against the courts in order to score
points with its partisan base.113 Correspondingly, rather than
reflect heartfelt disappointment with decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, the principal targets of recent congressional attacks against the courts have been state and lower federal
courts.114 Indeed, the Supreme Court could have mollified lawmaker concerns by, for example, upholding the Pledge or state
bans on same-sex marriage. Supporters of these measures,
however, had no interest in waiting for the Supreme Court to
speak. Their concern was with staking out a position on these
issues. A state court or lower federal court ruling provided
them with that opportunity and they seized it.115
Even when today’s lawmakers are truly concerned about
the ramifications of Supreme Court decision making, Congress
remains reluctant to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction. The
2005 legislation limiting detainee access to federal courts is the
exception which proves this rule. Rather than approve sweeping legislation that sought to nullify Rasul v. Bush, Congress
approved a compromise bill that sought to preserve meaningful
judicial review of the military’s handling of detainees at
Guantánamo Bay.116 By authorizing D.C. Circuit Court review
of military tribunal decisions, Congress simultaneously adguarding Our Religious Liberties Act, H.R. 4576, 109th Cong. (2005). This legislation would strip federal courts of jurisdiction over the Ten Commandments, the Pledge, and the National Motto. Id.
113. This is especially true of the House. With computer-driven redistricting guaranteeing some House seats to Republicans and others to Democrats,
House members need only appeal to party partisans who vote in primaries.
See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text. Senators, in contrast, run in
state-wide elections and must exercise caution before embracing proposals
that can alienate median voters. Perhaps for this reason, House votes on
court-stripping bills were taken too late in the legislative cycle for the Senate
to feel any pressure to consider these bills. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. But see supra note 75 (noting that a majority of Senators first served
in the House and, consequently, the Senate has become more and more like
the House).
114. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
115. One other reason that recent jurisdiction-stripping proposals are rhetorical is that the George W. Bush administration has not been asked to stake
out a public position on these bills. During the Warren and Burger Court eras
(when court-stripping proponents were truly upset with Supreme Court decision making), the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations were asked to testify before Congress. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 31, at 40–44.
116. See supra note 6.
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vanced the needs of the military (by eliminating often frivolous
habeas filings in federal district court) and an independent judiciary (by upholding the core principle of Rasul v. Bush,
namely, the need for independent judicial review of military decision making).117
In saying that the Roberts Court should not feel threatened
by recent congressional attacks on judicial independence, I do
not mean to suggest that the Court has carte blanche to rule as
it likes on any issue before it. For reasons I will detail in the final part of this Essay, the Roberts Court has substantial, but
not unlimited, authority to advance its favored policies and doctrines.
III. THE FUTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Unlike the Warren era (where a potent coalition of lawmakers was truly upset with Court decision making), today’s
Congress is not at all disappointed with Rehnquist Court decision making. Its anticourt rhetoric, for reasons detailed in Part
II, is tied to lawmaker incentives to strengthen ties with their
political base.118 Unless and until the goals of social conservatives are also acceptable to majorities in both houses of Congress and the White House, the current wave of attacks against
the judiciary should be seen as symbolic politics.
Indeed, even if the social conservative agenda becomes the
dominant agenda in Congress and the White House, there is
good reason to think that elected officials would steer away
from jurisdiction-stripping measures.119 First, median voters
117. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text. It is also noteworthy
that the compromise legislation was explicitly linked to another Senateapproved measure banning torture and the abuse of terrorism suspects held
by the U.S. military. See Weisman, supra note 60. In other words, Congress
did not intend to slap the courts down for limiting military prerogatives. Congress, instead, sought to put into place its vision of appropriate military decision making—a vision that spoke both to military overreaching (torture) and
the risk of frivolous habeas petitions unduly limiting military operations. See
id.
118. Part II focused on the incentives of Republicans to reach out to social
conservatives. Efforts by Democrats (who controlled the Senate in 2001 and
2002) to attack “conservative judicial activism” were cut from the same cloth.
See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. For an extended treatment, see
Devins, supra note 77, at 1325–35.
119. The arguments that follow would also apply to jurisdiction-stripping
proposals that might be championed by Democrats—assuming that Democrats
take over Congress and the White House. For additional discussion, see infra
note 138.

DEVINS_3FMT

2006]

05/17/2006 09:10:35 AM

SHOULD THE COURT FEAR CONGRESS?

1359

have historically backed judicial independence. For example,
although most Americans are disappointed with individual Supreme Court decisions, there is a “reservoir of support” for the
power of the Court to independently interpret the Constitution.120 Consequently, even though some Supreme Court decisions trigger a backlash by those who disagree with the Court’s
rulings, the American people nonetheless support judicial review and an independent judiciary.121 Indeed, even President
George W. Bush and Senate majority leader Bill Frist backed
“judicial independence” after the federal courts refused to challenge state court factfinding in the Terri Schiavo case.122
Second, there is an additional cost to lawmakers who want
to countermand the courts through coercive court-curbing
measures. Specifically, powerful interest groups sometimes see
an independent judiciary as a way to protect the legislative
deals they make.123 In particular, interest groups who invest in
the legislative process by securing legislation that favors their
preferences may be at odds with the current legislature or executive (who may prefer judicial interpretations that undermine the original intent of the law). Court-curbing measures
“that impair the functioning of the judiciary” are therefore disfavored because they “impose costs on all who use the courts,
including various politically effective groups and indeed the
beneficiaries of whatever legislation the current legislature has
enacted.” 124
Third (and correspondingly), lawmakers who disapprove of
court decision making can usually express that disapproval
without pursuing court-curbing legislation. This is especially
true of federalism rulings. Rather than foreclose democratic
outlets, federalism rulings can be circumvented by both Con120. Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 658 (1992). For a good
overview of the judicial independence literature, see generally Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596 (2003).
121. See Friedman, supra note 120, at 2624–29 (discussing, among others,
Michael Klarman’s work on how Warren Court decision making on race issues
prompted a political backlash).
122. Rather than follow the lead of some members of Congress (most notably Tom DeLay) and right-to-life interest groups, Bush and Frist thought it
inappropriate to condemn the courts for refusing to overturn the Florida
courts. Maura Reynolds, DeLay Tempers His Statements, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2005, at A11.
123. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 885 (1975).
124. Id.
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gress and the states.125 Congress can advance the same legislative agenda by making use of another source of federal power
and/or enacting a scaled-down version of the bill.126 Interest
groups, moreover, need not rely exclusively on Congress. They
can also turn to the states to enact state versions of the very
law that Congress could not enact.127 Rights-based rulings, in
contrast, severely limit lawmaker responses. Consider, for example, abortion rights. After Roe, neither federal nor state
lawmakers could regulate abortion in the first trimester.128
Likewise, Supreme Court decisions on school busing and school
prayer could not be nullified through legislation.129 At the same
time, rights-based rulings do not completely foreclose democratic outlets. Congress can eliminate federal funding and otherwise express its disapproval of the Supreme Court.130
Fourth, jurisdiction-stripping measures do not nullify Supreme Court rulings (or, for that matter, any court ruling).
Consequently, since proponents of court-stripping cannot count
on state courts to back their policy agenda, these bills may not
accomplish all that much.131 Accordingly, interest groups may
be better off pursuing their substantive agenda through funding bans, constitutional amendments, the enactment of related
legislation, and the appointment of judges and Justices. Courtcurbing measures, in contrast, seem more a rhetorical rallying
call than a roadmap for change.

125. See Neal Devins, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 131, 140–41 (2004).
126. See id. at 139–40.
127. Perhaps more significantly, interest groups rarely benefit from either
a narrow or expansive view of congressional power. When Congress enacts legislation that backs its preferences, interest groups benefit from a broad view of
congressional power. But interest groups benefit from a narrow view of congressional power in seeking to nullify legislation they oppose. See id. at 141.
128. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
129. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 29–31 (1971);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962).
130. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 29, at 40–42, 132–34; supra notes
52–54 and accompanying text (discussing congressional responses to rightsbased rulings in the 1970s and 1980s).
131. State supreme court justices, moreover, do not approve of federal efforts to push divisive federal constitutional issues into state courts. See, e.g.,
128 CONG. REC. 689, 689–90 (1982) (reprinting resolution adopted at the Conference of State Chief Justices). Correspondingly, there is reason to think that
state supreme courts would be reluctant to facilitate court-curbing legislation
by backing the agenda of interest groups that challenge federal judicial independence.
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That the Roberts Court need not worry about jurisdictionstripping legislation is important, but ultimately does not answer the question of whether the Court should fear Congress.
Congress, after all, can slap the courts down in other ways.132
Nevertheless, changes in Congress over the past twenty years
suggest that the Roberts Court has less reason to fear Congress
than did the Warren or Burger Courts. As detailed in Part II,
today’s lawmakers are less engaged in constitutional matters
and less interested in asserting their prerogative to independently interpret the Constitution. Correspondingly, lawmakers
place relatively more emphasis on expressing their opinions
than on advancing their policy preferences. Consequently, even
though the Rehnquist Court invalidated more federal statutes
than any other Supreme Court, Congress did not see the
Court’s federalism revival as a fundamental challenge to congressional power.133 Lawmakers, instead, preferred to appeal to
their base by speaking out on divisive social issues—launching
rhetorical attacks against lower federal courts and state courts.
Let me close on a cautionary note: the past may not be prologue. Widespread accusations of judicial activism may chip
away at the Court’s “reservoir of support.”134 That is the intent
of social conservatives who see the current round of courtstripping proposals as a way to transform the electorate—so
that a majority of voters will be comfortable with jurisdictionstripping and other attacks on judicial independence.135 More
significant, there is some reason to think that this campaign is
changing voter attitudes. A September 2005 poll, for example,
suggests that a majority of Americans think that “‘judicial activism’ has reached the crisis stage, and that judges who ignore
voters’ values should be impeached.”136 Time will tell whether
132. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also FISHER, supra
note 21, at 200–30.
133. For additional discussion, see Devins, supra note 58, at 448–54, and
Whittington, supra note 79, at 509–18.
134. Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 120, at 636–38. For additional discussion, see supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
135. See Rosenfeld, supra note 99.
136. Martha Neil, Half of U.S. Sees ‘Judicial Activism Crisis,’ A.B.A. J. EREPORT, Sept. 30, 2005, http://www.abanet.org/journal/ereport/s30survey
.html. This poll was about “judicial activism,” not the Supreme Court. However, a June 2005 CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll revealed a twenty percent drop
over five years in people’s approval of the Supreme Court (from sixty-two percent to forty-two percent) and a corresponding twenty percent increase in people disapproving of the Supreme Court (from twenty-nine percent to fortyeight percent). See PollingReport.com, Supreme Court/Judiciary Polls,
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this poll reflects changing voter attitudes. In the meantime, the
Roberts Court should recognize that today’s Congress is all
bark and no bite. Court-bashing is a rhetorical move, a political
strategy that emphasizes defeat and “harness[es] the energy
that such defeat stokes” among social—especially religious—
conservatives.137
There may come a time that the social conservative agenda
is the dominant agenda of Congress and the White House.
Were that to happen, the Court would run a great risk if it
were to buck that agenda. Of course, if that does happen, it is
likely that the appointments and confirmation process will result in the appointment of judges and Justices who share the
beliefs of the social conservative agenda.138

http://www.pollingreport.com/court2.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
137. Rosenfeld, supra note 99.
138. On the other hand, it is theoretically possible that Democrats will
soon regain control of the Congress. See Robin Toner, Democrats See Dream of
‘06 Victory Taking Form, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2005, at A1. Should that happen, it is possible that Democratic lawmakers would take aim at the Roberts
Court. Against the backdrop of recent Republican efforts to strip the federal
courts of jurisdiction, it is conceivable that Democrats too would be willing to
pursue jurisdiction-stripping measures. And if a Democrat were elected president in 2008, it is possible that such court-curbing legislation would be signed,
not vetoed. At the same time, for reasons detailed in this conclusion, Democrats would probably steer clear of jurisdiction-stripping measures. See infra
notes 119–31 and accompanying text.

